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CONSTRUCTION LAW
James R. Harvey, HI*
I. INTRODUCTION
Developments in Virginia construction law during the year
1999-2000 were more modest than those of 1998-1999. Still, sev-
eral decisions by the Supreme Court of Virginia, the Virginia
Court of Appeals, and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit justify the attention of those involved in the con-
struction industry and its related legal practice. These cases ad-
dress topics involving mechanic's lien waivers, the bar of sover-
eign immunity, recovery of direct and consequential damages,
surety obligations, tortious interference with the bid process, and
sanctions by the Virginia Board of Contractors. The majority of
these cases demonstrate that the appellate courts are more likely
to rule based upon the totality of the facts that define the contrac-
tual relationship rather than relying upon some particular and
discrete phrase in the contract as the determinative factor.
II. CASES FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGnUA
A. Direct or Consequential Damages
In what will likely be the most significant construction case of
last year, Blue Stone Land Co. v. Neff1 provides much needed
guidance as to whether certain elements of a claim qualify as di-
rect or consequential damages.2 Blue Stone Land Company ("Blue
Stone"), looking to develop its land, contracted with Neff to con-
* Attorney, Vandeventer Black LLP, Norfolk, Virginia. BA., 1989, University of Vir-
ginia; J.D., 1996, College of William and Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of Law. Mr. Har-
vey concentrates his practice in the area of construction litigation.
1. 259 Va. 273, 526 S.E.2d 420 (2000).
2. See id. at 278-79, 526 S.E.2d at 519.
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struct a road between their adjacent properties.3 Neff sued Blue
Stone when Blue Stone refused to pay Neff the contract balance.4
Blue Stone refused payment on the basis that Neff s failure to
complete the road in a reasonable amount of time constituted a
material breach of the contract and caused Blue Stone to incur
damages, including the cost of providing access to Blue Stone's
lots through the construction of another road.5 The trial court
granted Neffs motion in limine and refused to allow Blue Stone
to present evidence of damages for the cost of constructing the al-
ternate road reasoning that such damages were special damages
that should have been pled specifically.6 As a result, the court
struck Blue Stone's claim, and a jury granted judgment for Neff
in his action.7
The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed, concluding that the
damages Blue Stone sought for the alternate road were direct
damages and did not require special pleading.8 Citing a previous
holding, the court distinguished direct and consequential dam-
ages on the following basis:
Direct damages are those which arise "naturally" or "ordinarily"
from a breach of contract; they are damages which, in the ordinary
course of human experience, can be expected to result from a breach.
Consequential damages are those which arise from the intervention
of "special circumstances" not ordinarily predictable.
9
Finding that Blue Stone's claim involved "a garden-variety type
of breach of contract," the court determined that there were no
special circumstances present that would convert the resulting
damages from general to special.' °
According to the supreme court, each party understood the
risks of a breach in performance because they were both develop-
3. Id. at 275, 526 S.E.2d at 517.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 276, 526 S.E.2d at 517.
6. Id. at 277, 526 S.E.2d at 518. The trial judge stated: -I consider damages for con-
struction of an alternate route to [Blue Stone's] property to be special damages which
should have been pled specially.., and it's too late to change it now on the eve of trial.'
Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 278, 526 S.E.2d at 519.
9. Id. at 277-78, 526 S.E.2d at 519 (quoting Roanoke Hosp. Ass'n v. Doyle & Russell,
Inc., 215 Va. 769, 801, 214 S.E.2d 155, 160 (1975)).
10. Id. at 278, 526 S.E.2d at 519.
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ers that understood the objectives of the other in undertaking the
project." Neff should have expected that Blue Stone would be
forced to provide alternate access to the lots in the event it de-
layed or breached the contract. 2
Although the parties in this case may well have never contem-
plated or discussed the construction of an alternate route in the
event of delayed performance, the supreme court was willing to
infer this expectation upon the parties. 3 As a result, this decision
could have the effect of broadening recoverable direct damages
into the realm of previously classified consequential damages.
What qualifies as "expected" damages in the ordinary course of
human experience now comes closer to the tort-like "reasonably
foreseeable damages," even if they were not actually contem-
plated at the time of contract.' 4
It also appears that the term "consequential damages" has lit-
tle meaning under Virginia law. To be recoverable, the damages
must be reasonably expected (direct) or within the contemplation
of both parties (consequential). 5 If the damages were within the
contemplation of the parties, however, then they were certainly
"expected" damages and thus "direct." This may now provide
some ambiguity to the standard form AIA 201 contract that limits
liability for "consequential" damages. 6 In Virginia, that provision
may prove to be indistinguishable from the common law and




13. See id. at 277-81, 526 S.E.2d at 518-20.
14. The classic case of Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. Ch. 1854), set a
universally followed standard that limited a party in breach of a contract to only those
damages which were reasonably contemplated by the parties at the time of contract for-
mation. Id. at 151. This standard has always been viewed as a more stringent and limited
standard for damages than the "reasonably foreseeable" standard in tort. See, e.g., E.
ALLAN FARNSWORTH & WILLmI E. YOUNG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 518 (4th
ed. 1988). The two standards arguably merge in Blue Stone.
15. Blue Stone Land, 259 Va. at 277-78, 526 S.E.2d at 518-19.
16. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, AIA DOCuMENT A201-1997, GENERAL
CONDITIONS OF THE CONTRACT FOR CONSTRUCTION art. 4.3.10 (1997), reprinted in
CHARLES M. SINK & MARK D. PETERSEN, THE A201 DESKBOOK UNDERSTANDING THE
REVISED GENERAL CONDITIONS 21 (1998).
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B. Waiver of Mechanic's Liens
First American Bank of Virginia v. J.S.C. Concrete Construc-
tion, Inc.'7 once again reminds contractors and practitioners of
the limited value of Virginia's mechanic's lien statute.'8 In this
case, a building contractor sought payment from the owner for
work performed on a project.'9 The "Contractor Base Agreement"
between the parties contained explicit language that the contrac-
tor waived all mechanic's lien rights it may have possessed
against the property.2 ° Additional work was assigned to the con-
tractor through preprinted forms labeled "Extra Work Order."2
Under these forms, however, the contractor waived its rights to
file mechanics liens only after receiving payment.22
The contractor claimed that the unpaid work fell outside the
scope of the "Contractor Base Agreement" and thus was not sub-
ject to the waiver.23 While the commissioner and the trial court
agreed with this argument, the Supreme Court of Virginia dis-
agreed and reversed the lower court.2" The supreme court found
that the base agreement incorporated all work on the project, in-
cluding that done under the Extra Work Orders.2 The document
defined "work" broadly including extra work orders, and the extra
work order documents generally incorporated the terms of the
base agreement.2 6 By looking at the contract documents as a
whole, the court disposed of a more limited argument that did not
address the full intentions of the parties.27 The court's rationale
for this decision is aptly summarized as follows: "Manifestly, the
language of the documents contemplates that both must be read
together to set forth the fall understanding of the parties, and
that neither one standing alone constituted a complete con-
tract."
28
17. 259 Va. 60, 523 S.E.2d 496 (2000).
18. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 43-1 to -23.2 (Repl. Vol. 1999 & Cum. Supp. 2000).
19. First Am. Bank, 259 Va. at 63-65, 523 S.E.2d at 497-99.
20. Id. at 63-64, 523 S.E.2d at 498.
21. Id. at 64, 523 S.E.2d at 498-99.
22. Id. at 65, 523 S.E.2d at 499.
23. Id. at 66, 523 S.E.2d at 500.
24. Id. at 69-70, 523 S.E.2d at 501-02.






In City of Virginia Beach v. Carmichael Development Co.,29 the
Supreme Court of Virginia reaffirmed Virginia's commitment to
the doctrine of sovereign immunity.30 Carmichael Development
Company ("Carmichael") alleged that the City of Virginia Beach
tortiously interfered with its contract to purchase a "troubled"
property when it refused to grant Carmichael's permit applica-
tions and then purchased the property when the developer was
unable to consummate the deal.3' Carmichael desired to purchase
a controversial lot in Virginia Beach in order to construct a shop-
ping center, but the plan required an additional curb cut onto a
major thoroughfare.3 2 Following a review of Carmichael's "pre-
liminary site plan," the City planning office indicated that it
would not support approval of the plan.33 Carmichael never for-
mally submitted the plan and, as a result, failed to consummate
the transaction.3" In the interim, the City made an offer on the
troubled property that was eventually accepted by the owner.35
Carmichael sued the city for tortious interference with a con-
tract due to its refusal to approve the curb cut and its subsequent
offer to buy the property.36 The trial court permitted the tortious
interference claim to proceed "on the theory that the City's offer
to purchase the property tortiously interfered with Carmichael's
contract ...... A jury awarded judgment against the city." The
supreme court reversed, finding that the purchase of the property
fell within the protected umbrella of a "governmental function" as
opposed to a private function that was not entitled to protection. 9
29. 259 Va. 493, 527 S.E.2d 778 (2000).
30. See id. at 499, 527 S.E.2d at 781-82.
31. Id. at 497, 527 S.E.2d at 780-81.
32. Id. at 496, 527 S.E.2d at 780.
33. Id. (citing potential traffic problems and threats to public safety).
34. Id. at 496-97, 527 S.E.2d at 780. Approval of a site plan by the Virginia Beach City
Council was a condition of the contract between Carmichael and the seller. Id. at 496, 527
S.E.2d at 780.
35. Id. at 497, 527 S.E.2d at 780.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 498, 527 S.E.2d at 781. The trial court dismissed the claim of failure to ap-
prove the plan on sovereign immunity grounds, but held that the purchase of private lands
was not protected by sovereign immunity. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 501, 527 S.E.2d at 783.
2000]
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The court proclaimed that "the City's policy of acquiring by
contract and then reselling or leasing 'troublesome parcels'" has
both a proprietary and a governmental function.4  The court
characterized the property as "troublesome" because the owner
(the local SPCA) was unable to find a purchaser for a period of
over eleven years.41 This period of time served as the "overriding"
factor for the City to act in purchasing the land as a "governmen-
tal function to benefit the welfare and safety of the public."42
Carmichael illustrates the broad latitude the supreme court
grants governmental entities in assigning the basis for a "gov-
ernmental function" in order to advance the bar of sovereign im-
munity.
D. Tortious Interference in Bidding
In a deeply contentious case regarding a bid pursuant to the
Virginia Public Procurement Act,43 the Supreme Court of Virginia
ruled that a protesting bidder is not protected from liability for
claims of business torts.' Lockheed Information Management
Systems Co. v. Maximus, Inc. demonstrates that a party protest-
ing an award may face liability for its statements made as part of
a bid protest.
45
In Lockheed, each party bid on a Virginia Department of Social
Services project.46 A Notice of Intent to Award was made to
Maximus.47 Following a protest by Lockheed, which alleged that
two members of the evaluation panel had undisclosed conflicts of
interest, the Notice of Intent to Award was cancelled.48 Maximus
subsequently filed an action against Lockheed claiming, inter
alia, tortious interference of a contract expectancy.49 After an ap-
40. Id.
41. See id. at 496, 527 S.E.2d at 780.
42. Id. at 502, 527 S.E.2d at 783.
43. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 11-35 to -80 (Repl. Vol. 1999 & Cum. Supp. 2000).
44. Lockheed Info. Mgmt. Sys. Co. v. Maximus, Inc., 259 Va. 92, 116, 524 S.E.2d 420,
433 (2000).
45. See id.
46. Id. at 97, 524 S.E.2d at 422.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. Maximus also claimed conspiracy, but this count was dismissed by the Su-
preme Court of Virginia upon the second appeal as improperly preserved. Id. at 106-08,
524 S.E.2d at 427-49.
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peal in 1997, the supreme court concluded that such an action did
not require a showing of "malice" or "egregious conduct." ° A sec-
ond trial resulted in a judgment against Lockheed.5' Lockheed
appealed claiming statements made in the course of the bid pro-
test are entitled to absolute privilege as part of a quasi-judicial
proceeding.52
The Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed with Lockheed and
refused to extend such a privilege to bid protests.53 Justice Lacy,
writing for a unanimous court, reviewed the privilege and deter-
mined that "[t]he bid protest proceeding in which the statements
complained of in this case were made, however, did not have the
safeguards inherent in a judicial proceeding."5 Judicial proceed-
ings afford the protection of subpoena power, liability for perjury,
and the rules of evidence; by contrast, bid protests are often de-
termined without notice to either party or without a hearing.55
The court also found no merit in Lockheed's claim that the
statements, contained in its affidavits, were intended to influence
executive policy, or were made on the basis of legitimate business
competition and the protection of public interest.5" The court
found that affidavits do not provide the judicial protections de-
scribed; that the specific statements against Maximus were not
policy related, but related to a private, commercial matter;5" and
that the jury was properly instructed as to any defense of busi-
ness competition.58 The outcome of this case should serve as a
warning to litigious contractors that an inaccurately worded bid
protest or affidavit may produce more harm than benefit.
E. Virginia Contractor Transaction Recovery Act59
In Surprenant v. Board for Contractors,60 a rare case concern-
50. Id. at 97-98, 524 S.E.2d at 423 (citing Maximus, Inc. v. Lockheed Info. Mgmt. Sys.
Co., 254 Va. 408,493 S.E.2d 375 (1997)).
51. Id. at 98, 524 S.E.2d at 423.
52. Id. at 100-01, 524 S.E.2d at 424.
53. Id. at 101, 524 S.E.2d at 424-25.
54. Id.
55. See id.
56. Id. at 101-06, 524 S.E.2d at 425-27.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 106, 524 S.E.2d at 427.
59. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-1118 to -1127 (Repl. Vol. 1998 & Cure. Supp. 2000).
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ing the Virginia Contractor Transaction Recovery Act ("VCRA"),
the Virginia Court of Appeals protected homeowners by affirming
a circuit court finding of dishonest contractor conduct.6' Torre, the
homeowner, sued his general contractor, Surprenant's company,
Unique Builders, Inc., in circuit court and obtained a judgment
for breach of contract, including a ruling that Surprenant had
made material misrepresentations during the course of dealing.62
Torre then sought recovery pursuant to the VCRA" The Board's
Recovery Fund Committee eventually made an award in Torre's
favor and Surprenant appealed.'
The VCRA requires a finding of "improper or dishonest con-
duct" by the contractor as a prerequisite to an award.65 While
Surprenant challenged that finding by the Board, the court of ap-
peals found that the fact of "improper or dishonest conduct" was
established by the trial court before the matter was even brought
before the board and was therefore dispositive.66 Using the lim-
ited review standard required by the Virginia Administrative
Process Act,67 the court of appeals proceeded to uphold the
Board's decision against the contractor.8 This case demonstrates
the deference granted to a circuit court in the establishment of
underlying facts and the broad impact such findings may hold for
a contractor in a later administrative or judicial proceeding.
III. VIRGINIA CASES BY THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
A. Pay When Paid Provisions and Surety Obligations
The long held principal in Virginia that a surety stands in the
place of its principal and may assert those defenses available to
its principal69 may now be in jeopardy following the Fourth Cir-
60. 30 Va. App. 165, 516 S.E.2d 220 (Ct. App. 1999).
61. Id. at 167, 516 S.E.2d at 221.
62. Id. at 168, 516 S.E.2d at 221-22.
63. Id. at 169, 516 S.E.2d at 222.
64. Id. at 170, 516 S.E.2d at 222.
65. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-1120(A) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
66. Surprenant, 30 Va. App. at 171-75, 516 S.E.2d at 223-25.
67. VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:17 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
68. Surprenant, 30 Va. App. at 175, 516 S.E.2d at 225.
69. E.g., Bd. of Supervisors v. S. Cross Coal Corp., 238 Va. 91, 96, 380 S.E.2d 636, 639
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cuit's decision in Moore Bros. Co. v. Brown & Root, Inc.70 Applying
what the Fourth Circuit decided was Virginia law, the court
found that a surety cannot maintain the defense of a "pay when
paid" clause in a subcontract when the provision is not incorpo-
rated into the payment bond."
Brown & Root, Inc. ("Brown & Root") was a general contractor
for a road construction project along the Dulles Toll Road Exten-
sion, and possessed an ownership interest in the road. 2 It and the
other owners concealed from their financing company that addi-
tional paving was necessary, and the fact that such paving would
result in added construction costs. 3 At the same time, Brown &
Root included a "pay when paid" clause in its subcontract with
Moore Brothers Company ("Moore Brothers"), the subcontractor it
hired to perform the paving work. 4 Moore Brothers performed
the extra work; however, since the financing was not available to
pay Brown & Root, Moore Brothers was not compensated for its
additional costs. 5 As a result, Moore Brothers brought suit
against Brown & Root and its surety, Highlands.7
The payment bond obligated Highlands to pay Moore Brothers
"all sums justly due."7 Highlands argued unsuccessfully that this
meant that it was obligated to pay only those amounts due under
the subcontract. 8 Highlands believed it had no obligation under
the subcontract, because the condition precedent of the "pay when
paid" clause was not satisfied. 9 Both the District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia and the Fourth Circuit disagreed
with Highlands because the surety did not expressly incorporate
(1989).
70. 207 F.3d 717 (4th Cir. 2000).
7L Id. at 723.
72. Id. at 720.
73. Id. at 721.
74. Id. at 720. The subcontract stated:
Notwithstanding any other provision hereof, payment by Owner to General
Contractor is a condition precedent to any obligation of General Contractor to
make payment hereunder; General Contractor shall have no obligation to
make payment to Subcontractor for any portion of the Sublet Work for which
General Contractor has not received payment from the Owner.
Id.
75. Id. at 721.
76. Id. at 722.
77. Id. at 720.
78. Id. at 722.
79. Id. at 722.
2000]
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the "pay when paid" clause into the payment bond.8" Although
Judge Wilkins, in his dissent, agreed with Highlands that the
term "sums justly due" can only mean those due under the sub-
contract,"' the majority held that "there is no indication that the
parties intended the phrase 'sums justly due' to incorporate the
contingency of payment by the Owners." 2 The court found that
such a provision must be stated expressly in the payment bond.'
The court interpreted broadly the surety's obligation to pay for
work performed in the event of an owner's nonpayment, stating:
[The very purpose of securing a surety bond contract is to insure
that claimants who perform work are paid for their work in the event
that the principal does not pay. To suggest that non-payment by the
Owners absolves the surety of its obligation is nonsensical, for it de-
feats the very purpose of a payment bond.
84
Judge Wilkins, in contrast, decried the decision as rewriting an
agreement between sophisticated parties which is "completely at
odds with the freedom of contract principles embraced" by the
Supreme Court of Virginia. 5
This case presents an interesting dilemma for sureties on con-
struction projects. It appears that they now must expressly incor-
porate into their bond each risk-shifting provision in a subcon-
tract, creating a cumbersome and potentially ambiguous
document in order to avail themselves of their principal's de-
fenses. Otherwise, the surety's obligation will be more expansive
than that of the principal. This is truly an odd result, considering
that the principal usually must indemnify the surety for losses,
thus creating an obtuse method of recovery from a contractor oth-
erwise precluded by the subcontract. This will complicate the ne-
gotiation process between contractors as the surety must become
more intimately involved in defining its obligations apart from
those of its principal. While the facts of this case called for an
award in favor of the subcontractor, the Fourth Circuit's holding
sets a dangerous precedent and it is less than clear whether the
Supreme Court of Virginia would adopt such a holding.
80. Id. at 723-24.
81. Id. at 728 (Wilkins, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
82. Id. at 723.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 723 (emphasis added). The court also found against Brown & Root under the
prevention doctrine because Brown & Root's own actions assisted in the prevention of the
condition precedent's occurrence. See id. at 724-26.
85. Id. at 729 (Wilkins, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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B. Termination and Recovery from Performance Bonds
In keeping with the Fourth Circuit's propensity to issue
lengthy, unpublished, per curiam decisions that address signifi-
cant legal issues, Siegfried Construction, Inc. v. Gulf Insurance
Co. 6 gives at least some insight into the court's thinking regard-
ing the requirements of termination before recovery from per-
formance bonds under Virginia law. Though not a controlling
precedent,87 the case involved a contractor who attempted to re-
cover on its subcontractor's performance bond. 8 Applying Vir-
ginia law, the court found that under the language of the bond,
formal notice of termination was not required.89
The bond, like most issued today, obligated the surety upon two
conditions: (1) the subcontractor's default and (2) the general con-
tractor's declaration of the subcontractor's default.9" In this case,
the subcontractor failed to provide adequate labor to complete its
work, and the general contractor sent two notices of termination
before it began supplementing the subcontractor's manpower
with additional workers.9 ' After the supplementation, the subcon-
tractor was still not adequately progressing, and the general con-
tractor sent a notice to the surety that it intended to file a claim.92
The surety investigated but never provided any assistance. The
general contractor claimed the subcontractor then abandoned the
project; however, the general contractor never formally termi-
nated the subcontract.94
Although there was little dispute that the subcontractor was in
default of its subcontract agreement, the surety claimed that it
had no obligation because formal termination never occurred. 95
The District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia concurred
with this argument, but the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
86. No. CA-98-555-A, 2000 WL 123944 (4th Cir. Feb. 2, 2000) (unpublished table deci-
sion), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 2743 (2000).
87. See 4TH CIR. R. 36(b)-(c).
88. Siegfried Constr., 2000 WL 123944, at **2.
89. Id. at **4.
90. See id. at**3.
91. Id. at **1-2.
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cuit reversed. 9 It defined the term "default" as a breach of the
performance contract." It then found that the general contrac-
tor's repeated threats of termination "could reasonably be inter-
preted as pronouncements that [the subcontractor] was not ful-
filling its fundamental contractual obligations and that a claim
for payment under the bond would be forthcoming."" As a result,
the court found that the general contractor complied with the
bond's declaration of default requirement.' The Fourth Circuit
also found that "Virginia law does not counsel" the requirement of
an actual termination to declare default because notice of breach
of contract was sufficient. 100 The court stated that "equating ter-
mination with default could effect a major change in the construc-
tion industry in Virginia."101 Finally, it found that the general
contractor provided adequate notice to the surety before supply-
ing its own labor, noting that "Virginia courts have not been
overly strict in interpreting the notice requirements of construc-
tion bonds."0 2
Interestingly, just as in Moore Bros.,"°  the Fourth Circuit
broadly interpreted Virginia law with regard to contract interpre-
tation and surety law. The court took a more practical approach
than might be expected from the Supreme Court of Virginia in
approaching the requirement for a separate notice of default and
whether formal termination was necessary. Owners and contrac-
tors alike may now have greater flexibility to declare a default
and preserve their surety rights, while not terminating a contrac-
tor for actions that can be remedied before project completion.
Both should insist on similar language in future Virginia per-
formance bonds. Hopefully, the Fourth Circuit's functional ap-
proach to surety law will be applied by both federal and state
courts despite this case's unpublished status.
96. Id. at **5.
97. Id. at **3.
98. Id. at **4.
99. Id. at **6.
100. Id. at **4.
101. Id.
102. Id. at **6.
103. 207 F.3d 717 (4th Cir. 2000).
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IV. CONCLUSION
A review of the construction cases decided in 1999 and 2000
suggests a subtle broadening of contract interpretation and a
willingness by appellate courts to impose liability according to its
sense of equity. Blue Stone Land Co. v. Nef-]3 ' arguably broadens
the scope of recoverable "direct" damages,0° while Moore Bros.
Co. v. Brown & Root, Inc."6 and Siegfried Construction, Inc. v.
Gulf Insurance Co."0 7 broadens recovery against sureties.0 In the
area of tort, Lockheed v. Maximus"9 broadens a successful bid-
der's rights against inaccurate bid protesters. The courts limited
actions in only two cases. First, in City of Virginia Beach v. Car-
michael Development,"0 the Supreme Court of Virginia strength-
ened the scope of protected governmental functions, and second,
in First American Bank v. JSC Concrete". where the court inter-
preted change orders to incorporate the terms of the underlying
contract. Whether these decisions signal a trend in the appellate
courts can only be determined after the review of time.
104. 259 Va. 273, 526 S.E.2d 517 (2000).
105. See supra Part II.
106. 207 F.3d 717 (4th Cir. 2000).
107. No. CA-98-555-A, 2000 WL 123944 (4th Cir. Feb. 2, 2000) (unpublished table deci-
sion), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 2743 (2000).
108. See supra Part HILA-B.
109. 259 Va. 92, 524 S.E.2d 420 (2000).
110. 259 Va. 493, 527 S.E.2d 778 (2000).
111. 259 Va. 60, 523 S.E.2d 496(2000).
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